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The real option theory provides a useful tool to evaluate an R&D investment under 
uncertainty because, unlike the NPV (Net Present Value), it considers the managerial 
flexibility that may be expand the investment opportunity value. However, most R&D 
investment projects are open to competing firms in the same industry or line of business, and 
so the strategic considerations become extremely important. In this paper we analyze a real 
option game between two firms that invest in R&D. The firm that invests first, defined as the 
Leader, acquires a first mover advantage that we assume as a higher market share than other 
one, namely the Follower, that postpones its R&D investment decision. But, several R&D 
investments present positive externalities and so, the option exercise by the Leader generates 
an “Information Revelation” that benefits the Follower. Moreover, to value the flexibility time 
to realize the development phase, we consider the American-Exchange type options. 
JEL Code: G13, C72, C15, O32, D80. 
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 1 Introduction
The innovation is one of the important key strategies for ﬁrms to survive. There-
fore, Research and Development (R&D) investment plays an important role in the
successful performance for a ﬁrm. During the last two decades, the application of
option pricing formula to R&D has become of interest and numerous studies have
attempted to address how the real options analysis can help draw the proper line
between knowledge building and strategic positioning. In fact it is widely recognised
that the conventional NPV rule could in principle underestimate the value of an R&D
project because this method fails to take the managerial ﬂexibility into account. From
a modelling perspective, real R&D options valuation methods have tended to follow
ﬁnancial option pricing techniques. Analogous to ﬁnancial options on stocks, real op-
tions are options on real or physical assets such as technologies, production facilities
and so on. When a ﬁrm “invests”means that it exercises its option by involving an
initial cost to exchange for a real asset. According to Copeland & Antikarov (2003),
a real option is “the right, but not the obligation, to take an action (e.g. deferring,
expanding, contracting, or abandoning) at a predetermined cost called the exercise
price, for a predetermined period of time - the life of option”.
Several models, such as is assumed to be in Majd & Pindyck (1987), Trigeorgis (1991),
Lee (1997), are based on this deﬁnition, in which the exercise price is ﬁxed. But, for the
evaluation of real R&D investment opportunity, it is appropriate to consider that also
the investment cost is uncertain since the manager cannot make an accurate estimate
of the future costs. So the R&D investment opportunity corresponds to an exchange
option: it’s the exchange of an uncertain investment cost for an uncertain gross project
value. The most relevant models that value investment opportunities with two stochas-
tic variables are given in Margrabe (1978), McDonald & Siegel (1985), Carr (1988),
Carr (1995), Armada et al. (2007).
Margrabe (1978) developed a model to price the simple European exchange option
(SEEO) to exchange one risky asset for another one at maturity date T and McDon-
ald & Siegel (1985) considered that the assets distribute dividends. In a real options
context, “dividends” are the opportunity costs inherent in the decision to defer an
investment project. Furthermore, in a real options context, deferment implies the loss
of the project’s cash ﬂows. Carr (1988) model, building on Margrabe (1978) and Geske
(1979), provided the valuation of compound European exchange options (CEEO). This
model may be interpreted as a combination of a time-to-build option (growth option)
and an option to exchange (operating option). In addition, Carr (1988), Carr (1995)
Armada et al. (2007) provided an approximation to value a simple American exchange
option (SAEO). When the asset to be received in the exchange pays large dividend
yields, there is always a probability that the American exchange option will be exer-
cised prior to expiration. This means that managers have the timing choice for the
development phase realization that gives the opportunity to capture the project’s cash
ﬂows.
Moreover, competitive interaction becomes fundamentally important in the valuation
and exercise of real options, while it may not be such a signiﬁcant concern for ﬁnancial
options. Such competitive interactions may have profound eﬀects on option exercise
decisions and the resulting equilibrium. Real options and game-theory thinking have
been embraced by strategic decision-makers who recognise the importance of making
an early investment commitment (game theory) while maintaining managerial ﬂexi-
bility (real options) to adapt their choices to a changing market environment.
The aim of this paper is to analyse a real option game model between two ﬁrms that
2invest in R&D. The ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests, deﬁned as the Leader, acquires a ﬁrst mover
advantage that we assume as a highest market share. But, several R&D investments,
present positive externalities and so, the option exercise by the Leader, generates
an “Information Revelation”that beneﬁts the Follower. Moreover, to consider the
managerial ﬂexibility to realize the development investment D, we assume that the
opportunity to entry in the market is like an American exchange option.
This paper follows the Dias & Teixeira (2004), Villani (2008) and Cortelezzi & Villani
(2008) models that analyze the equilibrium strategies of two ﬁrms that invest in R&D
assuming the uncertainty about the R&D implementation and also considering the
information revelation process. We diﬀerentiate from them because we use American
exchange options to value the stochastic processes for R&D costs (D and R) and for
overall market value V deriving by R&D innovations and also to consider the man-
agerial ﬂexibility to realize the development investment D.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the relevant American op-
tion pricing literature while Section 3 derives the ﬁnal payoﬀs of two ﬁrms. In Section
4, we present a real model implementation with computation of critical market values
that delimit the several Nash equilibriums and, in Section 5, we analyze the eﬀects that
the most important parameters have on the game ranges. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Exchange Options Methodology
In this section we present the ﬁnal results to value American exchange options.
2.1 Simple American exchange option (SAEO)
Carr (1988) and Carr (1995) models give us the value of a Pseudo American exchange
option (PSAEO). In particular way, let t0 = 0 the evaluation date and T the maturity
date of the exchange option, we assume that V and D follow a geometric Brownian
motion process given by:
dV
V
= (µv − δv)dt + σvdZv (1)
dD
D









= ρvdσvσd dt (3)
where V and D are the Gross Project Value and the Investment Cost, respectively,
µv and µd are the equilibrium expected rate of return on asset V , and the expected
growth rate of the investment cost, δv and δd are the “dividend-yields”of V and D,
Zv and Zd are the Brownian standard motions of asset V and D, σv and σd are the
volatility of V and D respectively, ρvd is the correlation between changes in V and D.
Carr (1988) shows that the value of a PSAEO (S2) exercisable at time
T
2 or T is:
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• N(d) is the cumulative standard normal distribution;
• N2(x1,x2;ρ) is the standard bivariate normal distribution function evaluated
at x1 and x2 with correlation ρ;
• P
∗ is the unique value which makes indiﬀerent the option exercise or not at
time
T



























∗ − 1 (5)
Moreover, Armada et al. (2007) correct the two-moments extrapolation given in Carr
(1988) and Carr (1995) to approximate the value of a simple American exchange option
S(V,D,T). So, using the Armada et al. (2007) formula, we have that:




where s(V,D,T) is the value of a simple European exchange option (SEEO) given by
McDonald & Siegel (1985):
s(V,D,T) = V e
−δvTN(d1(P,T)) − De
−δdTN(d2(P,T)) (7)
2.2 Compound American exchange option (CAEO)
Exchange option are simple or compound. If the underlying asset is another option,
then the option is called compound. The underlying asset of a CAEO is the SAEO
S(V,D,τ), the expiration date is t1 and, following Carr (1988), the exercise price of
a CAEO is a proportion ϕ of asset D. Using Armada et al. (2007) extrapolation, we






• τ = T − t1 is the time to maturity of the SAEO with t1 < T;
• c2(S2(V,D,τ),ϕD,t1) is the Pseudo compound American exchange option (PCAEO)
whose underlying asset is the PAEO S2(V,D,τ) that can be exercised at middle
τ
2 and ﬁnal time T, the maturity date is time t1 and the exercise price is a
proportion ϕ of asset D;
• c(s(V,D,τ),ϕD,t1) is the value of a compound European exchange option (CEEO)
whose underlying asset is the simple European exchange option (SEEO) s(V,D,τ).
The value of PCAEO can be determined using Montecarlo simulation as illustrated in
Cortelezzi & Villani (2009).
43 The Basic Model Game
In our model we consider a competitive interaction between two ﬁrms (A and B) face an
R&D investment opportunity. Both ﬁrms can decide to invest at time t0 or to wait to
invest and so to postpone their decision at time t1. As it is know, the R&D investments
are uncertain and so, assuming by q and p the R&D success probability of ﬁrms A and









0 1 − p
The value of q and p depend by the Know-How that each player holds on. Moreover,
as it shown in Dias (2004), the R&D success or failure of one ﬁrm generates an in-
formation revelation that inﬂuences the investment decision of the other ﬁrm. So, if
ﬁrm A’s R&D is successful, the ﬁrm B’s probability p changes in positive information
revelation p
+, while p changes in negative information revelation p
− in case of A’s
failure. Symmetrically, the ﬁrm A’s R&D success changes in q
+ or in q
− in case of
ﬁrm B success or failure at time t0. Using Dias (2004) model, it results that:
p
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where the correlations ρ(X,Y ) and ρ(Y,X) are a measure of information revelation
from Y to X and from X to Y , respectively. Obviously, the information revelation
is considerable when the investment is not realized in the same time. So, if both
players invest simultaneously in R&D or they wait to invest, there is not information
revelation and consequently it results that p = p
+ = p
− and q = q
+ = q
−.
Under the threat of competition, the exercise of options strategically depends on the
trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts and costs of going ahead with an investment against
waiting for more information. So we state that the Leader is the pioneer ﬁrm (A or
B) that invests in R&D at time t0 earlier than other one, namely the Follower, that
defers exercising its option at time t1 to receive better information. Leader can take
an advantage of being ﬁrst in the market and, in particular way, we suppose that it
achieves the market share opportunity α ∈ (
1
2,1] of V higher than Follower’s one, that
is 1 − α. But, if the investment is realized in the same time, both players share the
market equally and so α =
1
2.
We denote by R the R&D investment for the development of a new product, V the
overall market value deriving by R&D innovations and D is the total investment cost
to realize new goods. We consider that the production investment of each ﬁrm is
proportional to its market share and it can be realized at anytime before T so we
consider the managerial ﬂexibility to realize the investment D. Therefore, the option
to enter in the market is like an American exchange option. In particular, we assume
that V and D follow the geometric Brownian motion deﬁned in the Eqs.(1) and (2)
respectively, and R = ϕD is a proportion ϕ of asset D, so R assumes the identical
5stochastic process of D except that it can be spent only at initial time t0 or at time
t1.
3.1 The Follower’s payoﬀ.
First of all, we analyze the game in which the ﬁrm A (Leader) invests in R&D at time
t0 and the ﬁrm B (Follower) decides to delay its R&D investment decision at time
t1. So, assuming the Leader’s R&D success, the Follower’s R&D success probability
changes in p
+ and, after the investment R, the Follower holds the development option
S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ) to invest (1 − α)D at anytime from t1 and T and claims a
share 1 − α of the overall market V . Of course, the investment R will be realized at
time t1 if the development option p
+S((1−α)V,(1−α)D,τ) is bigger than R. So, the
Follower’s payoﬀ at time t0 is a CAEO with maturity t1, exercise price equal to R and






R  (1−α)D 
τ 
p
+S((1−α)V,(1−α)D,τ)  (1−α)V  C(p
+) 






R  (1−α)D 
τ 
p
−S((1−α)V,(1−α)D,τ)  (1−α)V  C(p
−) 
(b) Follower’s Payoﬀ in case of Leader’s
failure
Figure 1: Follower’s payoﬀs
The CAEO payoﬀ at expiration date t1 with positive information revelation is:
C(p
+S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),R,0) = max[p
+S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ) − R,0]
Considering that R = ϕD is a proportion ϕ of asset D and denoting with C(p
+) the
CAEO at time t0, i.e.:
C(p
+) ≡ C(p
+s((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1)




+S2((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1) − c(p
+s((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1)
3
(9)
Alternatively, in case of Leader’s R&D failure, the Follower success probability changes
in p
− and the Follower holds, after the investment R at time t1, the development option
S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ) to invest (1 − α)D at anytime between t1 and T and claims
the market value (1 − α)V . So the Follower’s payoﬀ at time t0 is a CAEO with
maturity t1, exercise price equal to R and the underlying asset is the development
option S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ) as shown in Fig. 1(b). Hence, the CAEO payoﬀ with
negative information revelation at expiration date t1 is:
C(p
−S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),R,0) = max[p
−S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ) − R,0]
So, denoting with C(p
−) the CAEO at time t0, i.e.:
C(p
−) ≡ C(p
−S((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1)




−S2((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1) − c(p
−s((1 − α)V,(1 − α)D,τ),ϕD,t1)
3
(10)
The Follower obtains the CAEO C(p
+) in case of Leader’s success with a probability
q or the CAEO C(p
−) in case of Leader’s failure with a probability (1 − q). Hence,
the Follower’s payoﬀ at time t0 is the expectation value:
FB(V,D) = qC(p
+) + (1 − q)C(p
−) (11)
Similarly, if we consider that ﬁrm B (Leader) invests in R&D at time t0 and ﬁrm A
(Follower) decides to wait to invest it results:
FA(V,D) = pC(q
+) + (1 − p)C(q
−) (12)
Using Cortelezzi & Villani (2009) model, we are able to determine the Follower’s payoﬀ
through Montecarlo simulation. In particular way, the appendix (A) shows the Matlab
algorithm to obtain the values given by Eqs. (11) and (12).
3.2 The A and B payoﬀs when both ﬁrms invest simultaneously in R&D.
In this situation, both players decide to realize the R&D investment simultaneously
at time t0. Hence, we can setting that there is not information revelation and con-
sequently it results that ρ(Y,X) = ρ(X,Y ) = 0. Since the investment R is equal for
both ﬁrms, we assume that A and B can capture the same fraction α =
1
2 of the overall
market value. So, after the investment R in t0, A and B hold with a probability q and
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pS(1/2 V,1/2 D,T) 
(b) Firm B’s payoﬀ
Figure 2: A and B payoﬀs in case of simultaneous investment
According to Eq.(6), we can write the A and B payoﬀs in case of simultaneous R&D
investment at time t0 as:














































73.3 The Leader’s payoﬀ
Now we analyse the game in which ﬁrm A (Leader) invests in R&D at time t0, assuming
that ﬁrm B (Follower) decides to postpones its decision waiting better information. In
this case, the Leader spends the investment R at time t0 and obtains, in case of success
with a probability q, the development option S(αV,αD,T) that gives the opportunity
to invest αD at anytime before T and to claim a market share α >
1
2, as illustrated
in the Fig. 3. Thus the Leader’s payoﬀ (ﬁrm A) will be:
LA(V,D) = −R + q   S (αV,αD,T)






Symmetrically, if we consider that ﬁrm B (Leader) realizes the R&D investment at
time t0 and player A postpones its decision, the ﬁrm B payoﬀ will be:
LA(V,D) = −R + p   S (αV,αD,T)












qS(αV, αD, T) 
Figure 3: Leader’s payoﬀ
3.4 The A and B payoﬀs when both ﬁrms wait to invest.
Finally, we suppose that both players decide to delay their R&D investment decision
at time t1 and, speciﬁcally, we can assume that there is not information revelation
and consequently ρ(Y,X) = ρ(X,Y ) = 0. As we have seen in simultaneous case, we
can setting that A and B share the market equally and so α =
1
2. Then, after the










2D at anytime before T and claims a market share
1
2V . So,
at time t0, the A and B payoﬀs are CAEO with maturity t1, exercise price equal





probability q and p respectively, as illustrated in the Figs 4(a) and 4(b).
Thus, A and B payoﬀs at time t0 are given by:
WA(V,D) = C
￿
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(b) Firm B’s payoﬀ













So, the appendix (A) shows the Matlab algorithm to determine the ﬁrms A and B wait-
ing payoﬀs through Montecarlo simulation. It’s suﬃcient to consider that information
revelation ρ(X,Y ) = 0 and α =
1
2.
3.5 Final payoﬀs at time t0
The two-by-two matrix represented in the Fig.5 summarizes the ﬁnal payoﬀs. The
ﬁrst value in each cell indicates the strategic investment opportunity for A at time t0,
while the second represents the ﬁrm B’s value. We can distinguish four basic cases:
(i) when both ﬁrms decide to postpone the R&D investment at time t1; (ii) and (iii)
when one ﬁrm invests ﬁrst (as a Leader) and the other decides to invest later (as a
Follower); (iv) when both ﬁrms decide to invest simultaneously in R&D at time t0.
(L
A,F






























Figure 5: Final payoﬀs at time t0
4 Real Applications
4.1 Assumptions and Inputs
This model can be applied to analyse industries such as high-tech, pharmaceutical,
telecommunication, oil, in which competitors can substantially inﬂuence a ﬁrms in-
vestment opportunity. In fact, a ﬁrm may pre-empt competition and capture a sig-
niﬁcant share of the market α >
1
2 by setting the R&D investment early on. This is
9an important source of advantage that may establish a sustainable strategic position.
But, the ﬁrm that delays investment, can derive information about its R&D success
from observing the R&D performance of the other player.
So, to illustrate the concepts and equations presented, we develop a numerical example
for the competitive R&D game between ﬁrms A and B with the following parameters:
• R&D Investment: R= 150000 $;
• Development Investment: D= 400000 $;
• Market and Costs Volatility: σv = 0.90; σd = 0.23;
• Proportion of D required for R: ϕ =
R
D = 0.375
• Correlation between V and D: ρvd = 0.15;
• Dividend-Yields of V and D: δv = 0.15; δd = 0;
• Expiration Time of Compound Option: t1 = 0.5 years;
• Expiration Time of Simple Option: T = 3 years;
• A and B success probability: q = 0.60; p = 0.55;
• Information Revelation: ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(Y,X) = 0.70;
• Leader’s Market Share: α = 0.60;
• Critical Price K = 1.6722:
We consider ﬁve expected total market values V : 800000$ (low expected return),
1000000$, 1200000$ (medium expected return) and 1400000$ and 1600000$ (high
expected return). V corresponds to present value of the expected cash ﬂows deriving
by R&D innovations . We assume that V follows the Brownian motion presented in
Eq.(1).
The total investment cost D is the exercise price for the development option. We
consider that the investment cost is proportional to market share, namely if the ﬁrm’s
market share is α then its investment cost will be αD. We assume that D follows the
Brownian motion process deﬁned in Eq.(2). The total current value of D is 400000$
and it can be spent at anytime before T.
The R&D investment R can be realized at time t0 or t1. If it is made in t0, then
R = 150000$ otherwise the investment R assumes the identical stochastic process of
D, except that it occurs at time t1 and it is proportional to ϕ = 0.375 of D.
Appropriately, we assume that the volatility of quoted shares and traded options is
an adequate proxy for the volatility of asset V and investment cost D. As the R&D
investments present a high uncertainty about their results, we assume that σv = 0.90
and the cost volatility is σd = 0.23.
According to ﬁnancial options, δ denotes the opportunity cost in holding the option
instead of the stock. So, in real option world, δv is the opportunity cost of deferring
the project and δd is the “dividend yield” on asset D. As at the beginning the cash
ﬂows are very low, so we assume that δv = 0.15 and δd = 0.
The time to maturity T denotes project’s deferment option after that each opportunity
disappears and we adopt T = 3 years. Moreover, we state that Follower needs about
six months to know the Leader’s outcome and consequently to receive the information
revelation. So we assume that t1 = 0.5 years.
K denotes the critical price value that makes indiﬀerent the exercise or not at middle
time
τ
2 of a PSAEO S2(V,D,
τ
2). So to determine K it is suﬃcient to use Eq. (5) with
T = τ. For our adapted numbers it results K = 1.6722.
Finally, we consider that ﬁrm A has an higher and more eﬃcient Know-How than ﬁrm
B and so, the ﬁrm A’s success probability is q = 0.60 while the ﬁrm B’s one is p = 0.55.
104.2 Empirical Results
The Table 1 shows the Montecarlo simulation assuming the several overall market
values. In particular way we compute, for each player, four Montecarlo simulations
and, to determine the ﬁnal Follower and the Waiting strategic payoﬀs, we compute the
average value. We assume that the number of simulations n is equal to 100000. As it
is shown in Cortelezzi & Villani (2009), this simulations number allows us to obtain a
very low variance and to improve the eﬃciency of computations.
Strategy 1st MC 2nd MC 3rd MC 4th MC Average Value
FA(800000) 26620 26525 26573 26663 26595
FB(800000) 23936 23862 23916 23999 23928
WA(800000) 30760 30675 30777 30875 30772
WB(800000) 25191 25133 25227 25323 25219
FA(1000000) 47146 47147 47103 47087 47120
FB(1000000) 43232 43060 43024 42988 43076
WA(1000000) 56355 56123 56089 56004 56143
WB(1000000) 47146 46925 46900 46780 46938
FA(1200000) 72288 72286 71908 72176 72164
FB(1200000) 66707 66711 66359 66608 66596
WA(1200000) 87566 87618 87150 87484 87455
WB(1200000) 74349 74369 73977 74261 74239
FA(1400000) 100510 100750 100510 100420 100548
FB(1400000) 93460 93687 93460 93356 93491
WA(1400000) 123240 123530 123240 123030 123260
WB(1400000) 105810 106060 105810 105650 105833
FA(1600000) 130940 131290 131430 131440 131275
FB(1600000) 122380 122720 122830 122870 122700
WA(1600000) 161490 162000 162020 162130 161910
WB(1600000) 139850 140290 140330 140460 140233
Table 1: Simulated Values of Follower and Waiting Strategies
The Tables 2 and 3 summarize the strategic A and B payoﬀs considering the several
expected total market values. The Figs. 6 and 7 show the A and B strategic
values. We can observe that, when the expected market value V = 0, the simple
and the compound American exchange option values are zero and so it results that
Li(0) = Si(0) = −R and Fi(0) = Wi(0) = 0, for i = A,B. Now, to determine the
several Nash equilibriums, we introduce the critical market values that realize the


















Si), for i = A,B. Through Figs. 6 and
11Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LA FA SA WA
800000 -4474 26595 -28728 30772
1000000 48152 47120 15126 56143
1200000 102894 72164 60745 87455
1400000 159113 100548 107594 123260
1600000 216402 131275 155335 161910
Table 2: Firm A’s ﬁnal payoﬀs assuming α = 0.60 and ρ(X,Y ) = 0.70
Market Leader’s Value Follower’s Value Simultaneous Value Waiting Value
Value V LB FB SB WB
800000 -16601 23928 -38834 25219
1000000 31639 43076 1366 46938
1200000 81819 66596 43183 74239
1400000 133354 93491 86128 105833
1600000 185869 122700 129891 140233




WA ≃ 1070000; V
∗
WB ≃ 1130000; V
∗
SA ≃ 1320000; V
∗
SB ≃ 1490000.
When the expected market value V < V
∗
WA, we have the following inequality among
the strategic values:
LA(V ) < WA(V ); LB(V ) < WB(V ); FA(V ) > SA(V ); FB(V ) > SB(V );
So, using this inequality, we have one Nash equilibrium (WA,WB). For instance,
assuming that the expected market value is equal to V = 800000 (low return), the
two by two matrix represented in Fig. 8(a) shows the (WA,WB) Nash equilibrium in
which ﬁrms A and B prefer to wait for best market evolutions and so they decide to
delay their R&D investment decision at time t1.
Instead, if the expected market value V > V
∗
SB, it results the following inequality
among the stratigic values:
LA(V ) > WA(V ); LB(V ) > WB(V ); FA(V ) < SA(V ); FB(V ) < SB(V );
So, assuming that the expected market value V = 1600000 (high return), there is
one Nash equilibrium (SA,SB) as shown in the Fig. 8(d). Both ﬁrms decide to invest
simultaneously in R&D at time t0 to take advantage of high market value.





among the strategic payoﬀs is:
LA(V ) > WA(V ); LB(V ) < WB(V ); FA(V ) > SA(V ); FB(V ) > SB(V );
In this case we have one Nash equilibriums (LA,FB). Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm with the
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Overall Market Value V
Figure 6: Firm’s A Strategic Values
that other one (ﬁrm B) that postpones its R&D investment decision at time t1 waiting




SB[, we have the following
relation among the strategic payoﬀs:
LA(V ) > WA(V ); LB(V ) > WB(V ); FA(V ) < SA(V ); FB(V ) > SB(V );
Also in this case, using the above relations, we have one Nash equilibrium (LA,FB).
For instance, if V = 1400000, the Fig. 8(c) shows that there exists one Nash equilib-
rium (LA,FB).




SA[, we have the following inequality among the
strategic values:
LA(V ) > WA(V ); LB(V ) > WB(V ); FA(V ) > SA(V ); FB(V ) > SB(V );
In this case we have two Nash equilibriums: (LA,FB) and (FA,LB). In the ﬁrst
equilibrium ﬁrm A invests immediately at time t0 while B postpones its R&D decision
at time t1 waiting better information, vice versa in the second equilibrium. If we
consider that V = 1200000, we have two Nash equilibriums as it is represented in the
Fig. 8(b).
5 The eﬀects of ρ(X,Y ), α and δv on the equilibriums




SB] we have one Nash equilibrium
(LA,FB) or two Nash equilibriums (LA,FB);(FA,LB) that we can solve by mixed
strategies. Now we are interested to analyse the eﬀects that the information revela-
tion ρ(X,Y ), the ﬁrst mover’s advantage α and the dividend yield δv have on Nash
equilibriums of both players.
First of all, it is obvious that the strategic payoﬀs using American exchange options
are bigger then European one since American options give the managerial ﬂexibility
value to realize the investment D prior to maturity T. In particular way, comparing
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Figure 7: Firm’s B Strategic Values




SB go down with respect to European options




SB] ≃ [1070000,1490000] = 420000 is smaller
then [1349400,1898700] = 549300 using European options. So we can state that, us-
ing the managerial ﬂexibility, both ﬁrms reduce the critical market values that bound
both the opportunity to delay the R&D investment decision (wait and see policy) and
the simultaneous investment implementation. So, with American options, the R&D
investment can be realized at time t0 when V = 1070000$ instead of V = 1349400$.
Moreover, when the dividend yields δd and δv go to zero, then the CAEO and SAEO
prices are equal to CEEO (see Carr (1988)) and SEEO (see McDonald & Siegel (1985))
respectively, since there is not the incentive to exercise the American option prior to
maturity date T. So for our adapted number, assuming that δv = 0, we have that
V
∗
WA ≃ 860000 and V
∗
SB ≃ 1305000.
The Table 4 shows the eﬀects that the information revelation has got on the game
ranges. To simplify, we assume that ρ(X,Y ) = ρ(Y,X). The conditions to respect to
have 0 ≤ p
+ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p
− ≤ 1 is that:










In our applications it results that 0 ≤ ρ(X,Y ) ≤ 0.9026. We can observe that the




















we have one Nash equilibrium) enlarge.
The Table 5 shows the eﬀects that the ﬁrst mover’s advantage has on the critical
market values and in particular way we can note that, if the Leader’s market share α
increases, then all the critical market values go down. When α = 1 then the Follower’s
strategy values zero since its market share is 1 − α = 0.
14−4 474 $   −28 728 $  −38 834 $ 
26 595 $  
23 928 $ 






















  Nash Equilibrium 
(a) I Case: V = 800000$
102 894  $   60 745 $  43 183 $ 
72 164 $  
66 596 $ 






















  Nash Equilibrium 
Nash Equilibrium 
(b) II Case: V = 1200000$
159 113 $   107 594 $  86 128 $ 
100 548 $  
93 491 $ 
























(c) III Case: V = 1400000$
216 402 $   155 335 $  129 891 $ 
131 127 $  
122 700 $ 
























(d) IV Case: V = 1600000$
Figure 8: Final payoﬀs
ρ(X,Y ) V ∗
SA V ∗
SB V ∗
WB − V ∗
WA V ∗
SA − V ∗
WB V ∗
SB − V ∗
SA
0 1155000 1228000 60000 25000 73000
0.10 1165000 1262000 60000 35000 97000
0.30 1203000 1307000 60000 73000 104000
0.50 1235000 1380000 60000 105000 145000
0.70 1320000 1490000 60000 190000 170000
0.90 1439000 1690000 60000 309000 251000






0.60 1070000 1130000 1320000 1490000
0.70 858000 906000 1070000 1161000
0.80 742000 791000 975000 1042000
0.90 662000 703000 935000 998000
1 609000 645000 932000 993000
Table 5: Variation of Leader’s Market Share with ρ(X,Y ) = 0.70 and δv = 0.15
156 Concluding Remarks.
The R&D investment is an important successful key for the ﬁrm performance. An R&D
investment opportunity is not held by one ﬁrm in isolation and so the competitive con-
siderations become extremely important. The theory of option games combines two
successful theories, namely real options and game theory. By real options we value an
R&D investment opportunity using ﬁnancial techniques and, in particular way, we use
Montecarlo simulations to value an American exchange options that take into account
the managerial ﬂexibility to realize the investment D at anytime before the maturity
T. By the game theory, we consider strategic interactions between two ﬁrms. The
ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests, deﬁned as the Leader, acquires a ﬁrst mover advantage that we
assume as a higher market share then Follower’s one, that postpones the R&D invest-
ment. But, in our model, we assume that Follower receives an information revelation









SB, we are able to determine the range game in which is optimal each strategy
policy in Nash meaning and we have showed the eﬀects that most important parame-
ters have on the game. So, when V < V
∗
WA we have one Nash equilibrium (WA,WB)
and if V > V
∗
SB the optimal Nash policy is the simultaneous investment (SA,SB) at








SB[ we have one Nash
equilibrium (LA,FB) in which the ﬁrm with the highest success probability realizes





two Nash equilibriums: (LA,FB) and (FA,LB). In this case we need to use the mixed
strategies to solve the game.
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A Montecarlo Simulation to determine Follower’s payoﬀ
In this algorithm, we denote by ‘f’ the proportion ϕ of asset D to determine the
research investment R, by ‘pL’ and ‘pF’ the R&D success probability of Leader and
Follower respectively, and by ‘rev’ the information revelation. Moreover, ‘n’ is the
number of simulations and ‘K’ denotes the critical market value that makes indiﬀerent
the exercise or not at middle time
τ
2 a PSAEO S2(V,D,τ).
function FOLLOWER=MCAmerComp(V0,D0,f,dV,dD,T1,T2,K,sigV,sigD,rhoVD,...
pL,pF,rev,alpha,n);
% R&D success probability with positive and negative information revelation
pp=pF+sqrt((1-pL)/(pL))*sqrt(pF*(1-pF))*rev;
pm=pF-sqrt((1-pL)/(pL))*sqrt(pF*(1-pF))*rev;
sig=sqrt(sigV.^2+sigD.^2-2*rhoVD.*sigV.*sigD); %Variance of asset P;
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